The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem [11] . Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.
Introduction
Given a set of individuals with preferences on alternatives, a set-valued social choice function or social choice correspondence selects for all preferences profiles a subset of alternatives. Yet, there are socio-economic environments where alternatives are incompatible and a unique alternative has to be selected. In such kind of situations we can give a meaning to set-valued social choice functions by interpreting the image as a preselected set from which the winning alternative has still to be determined. The main objective of this paper is to study set-valued social choice functions axiomatically when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and believe that all preselected alternatives have the same chance of being finally chosen. 1 To be more concrete, we are interested in the following kind of problem:
Consider a firm which opens a job offer for specialized candidates with a certain profile. Since the amount of extractable information from the applications is partial, firms use different filters before taking their final decision. The first one is often to invite a number of candidates for a job interview. If the recruiting committee decides by voting whom to interview, then every member of the recruiting committee classifies candidates either as "acceptable" or as "nonacceptable", that is the members of recruiting committee have dichotomous preference on the set of candidates. Thus, we ask how the different opinions should be aggregated in order to determine whom to invite for a job interview.
Yet, it can happen that only the opinion of a subgroup of individuals is available, because some members of the recruiting committee may strictly prefer to abstain from voting for reasons which lie outside of the model. Similarly, some candidates may have already accepted job offers from other firms, and, as a result, the recruiting committee faces a restricted choice set. In order to capture these two restriction in our model we consider families of set-valued social choice functions instead of set-valued social choice functions. The drawback of the more general analysis is that the image of the family can be conditionalized on the set of feasible alternatives and the set of voters. To rule out this possibility, we impose two consistency conditions that describe how the set of preselected alternatives changes as the set of feasible alternatives or the set of voters varies. The condition regarding the set of voters states that individuals who are indifferent between all feasible alternatives do not matter for the final outcome, whereas the one regarding the set of feasible alternatives strengthens the rationalizability condition property α of Sen and Pattanaik [14] . 2 Finally, 1 Among others, further work on set-valued social choice functions is due to Duggan and Schwartz [7] , Barberà et. al [1] , and Ching and Zhou [6] . 2 Property α states that if one compares two social choice correspondences differing from each other in such a way that the considered set of alternatives in the second problem is a we define a social choice rule to be a family of set-valued social choice functions that is consistent in alternatives and individuals, and therefore, the question we deal with is which social choice rule satisfies a set of desirable properties.
One key property to be investigated is strategy-proofness, because it formalizes the idea that individuals have incentives to represent their preferences truthfully. 3 Since individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternative and, given a set of feasible alternatives and a set of voters, the social choice function is set-valued, we have to make assumptions how individual order subsets of alternatives in order to introduce of strategy-proofness properly.
To see this suppose that the set of alternatives is equal to {x, y, z} and that the dichotomous preference relation for some individual is such that {z} is the only non-acceptable alternative. In this case, the ordering between {x} and the set {x, y, z} is not defined which implies that we cannot make statement regarding incentives. To solve this problem we extend the dichotomous preferences in such a way as if individuals believed that the final step of the decision process is resolved by a lottery which gives equal chance to every preselected alternative.
This extension is called cohesive.
In the third Section of the paper, we analyze the relationship between families of set-valued social choice functions and social welfare functions. Blair and Muller [3] show that a domain of strict preferences admits the construction of a strategy-proof family of single-valued social choice functions if and only if the domain admits the construction of a social welfare function which is monotone and satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). A similar result is not true for dichotomous preferences when preferences are extended in a cohesive way. In particular, strategy-proofness on the cohesive dichotomous domain of a family of set-valued social choice functions is a necessary but not a sufsubset of the one considered in the first problem, then every alternative in the image of the first social choice correspondence has to be in the image of the second one. We assume that the choice set of the second problem is equal to the choice set of the first one restricted to the set of alternatives which is still available. 3 The most important contribution on incentive problems in social choice theory is the impossibility theorem of Gibbard and Satterthwaite which has been extended to social choice correspondences by Duggan and Schwartz [7] . Given its negative flavor, one strand of the literature examines the existence of strategy-proof social choice functions on restricted domains, e.g. Grove and Loeb [10] , Moulin [12] , Sprumont [15] , and Barberà et. al [2] . ficient condition for the corresponding social welfare function to be monotone and to satisfy IIA. Proposition 1 states that it is possible to recover sufficiency by imposing in addition to strategy-proofness the properties of neutrality and consistency in individuals.
Approval Voting is one of the most prominent voting rules. Organizations which apply it are diverse and include the United Nations, the Mathematical Association of America, the Econometric Society, and the Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences. 4 In their seminal paper Brams and Fishburn [5] propose a preference extension that together with the definition of stragegy-proofness induces the same incentives on the dichotomous preference domain as cohesive preferences. Then they show that Approval Voting is strategy-proof on the extended preference domain and selects the set of Condorcet winners. Recently Vorsatz [16] has shown that the Borda Count is equivalent to Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain and that all scoring rules different from the Borda Count are manipulable on the cohesive dichotomous domain. Hence, three of the most well known aggregation rules coincide on the dichotomous preference domain which makes Approval Voting an intuitive choice. To our knowledge the only characterizations of Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain are due to Fishburn [8] and [9] .
In [9] the preference extension proposed in the paper by Brams and Fishburn [5] is used in order to show that Approval Voting is the only family of anonymous set-valued social choice function which is neutral, strategy-proof, and satisfies consistency property. On the other hand, in [8] it is shown that if the set of alternatives contains at least three alternatives, then Approval Voting is characterized among all anonymous set-valued social choice functions by means of neutrality, consistency and disjoint equality. In Section 4, we make use of the results of Section 3 in order to prove that a social choice strategy-proofness on the cohesive dichotomous domain, neutrality, anonymity and strict monotonicity if and only if it is Approval Voting (Theorem 1). This results differs from the characterization of Fishburn [8] mainly in three points: First, we use the property of strict monotonicity instead of a consistency condition. Second, in Theorem 1 anonymity is a proper axiom, and finally, Fishburn [8] considers the set of voters to be fixed. From this point we restrict the analysis to the case when all individuals reveal their preferences. Theorem 2 and 3 state that a social choice function is strict symmetry, neutrality, and strict monotonicity (efficient) if and only if it is Approval Voting. 5 Since strict symmetry strengthens the property of anonymity, we can relate Theorem 2 to May's Theorem [11] which states that if the number of alternatives is equal to two and the preference domain is the set of all weak orders on the set of alternatives, then the Majority Rule is characterized by means of anonymity, neutrality, and strict monotonicity. Hence, Theorem 2 shows that it is possible to consider any number of alternatives if the property of anonymity is replaced by the one of strict symmetry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we introduce notation and basic definitions. In Section 3, the results which relate social welfare functions and social choice functions are presented. In Section 4, we propose three different characterizations of Approval Voting. Some additional results and examples can be found in the Appendix.
Notation and Definitions
Consider a group of individuals N with preferences on the set of alternatives K whose objective is to aggregate their preferences by choosing a non-empty subset of K. It is assumed that individuals can abstain from voting, that is only the set of individualsN ⊆ N participates in the decision process. Moreover, it may happen that only a subset of alternatives is feasible, and therefore, we restrict the set of implementable alternatives to be equal toK ⊆ K. The aggregation problem is interesting only if |K| ≡k ≥ 2 and |N | ≡n ≥ 1. 5 The intuition of strict symmetry is as follows: Suppose that there are two different preference profile which differ from each other just because some alternative which is good for the first individual and bad the second individual according to first preference profile is good for the second individual and bad for the first individual according to the second preference profile. Then, the image of a social choice function is the same at both preference profiles. With a slight abuse of notation we write fK(DN ) instead of fK ,N (DN ). Throughout indexes are suppressed whenever no restriction is made on the set of feasible alternatives or the set of individuals.
We impose two consistency conditions on the family fK ,N K ⊆K,N ⊆N that 6 We do not consider the empty set, because we want to study exclusively situations where some decision has to be taken. Moreover, there are two technical reasons for excluding the empty set: First, since we are interested in strategic voting, we have to make assumptions on how an individual orders subsets of K. Yet, if Di ∈ D is such that G(Di) = ∅ and B(Di) = ∅, then it is not obvious how an individual orders the empty set versus some non-empty subsets of K. For example, if x ∈ G(Di) and y ∈ B(Di), then it is ambiguous whether i prefers the empty set or {x, y}. Second, Approval Voting is not efficient any more if the empty set can be chosen. 
Observe that consistency in alternatives is a stronger rationalizability condition than the one proposed by Sen and Pattanaik [14] (property α) which asks that
The meaning of this condition is as follows: The decision makers suppose a priori that every alternative is feasible and determine which alternatives to pre-select. After taking this decision it may turn out that less alternatives are feasible, and therefore, the set of pre-selected alternative is restricted accord- 
( D i is strict whenever the inequality is strict).
The following example illustrates the concept of cohesive preferences.
Example 2: Let the preference relation D i be such that G(D i ) = {x, y} and
The cohesive extension of dichotomous preferences has been rationalized by Vorsatz [16] in the following way: If we interpret fK(DN ) as a set of pre-selected alternatives from which a unique winning alternative has to be determined via a lottery and individuals are expected utility maximizers, then individuals care only about the probability that a good alternative is chosen. If, in addition, individuals assign to all alternatives belonging to fK(DN ) the same winning probability (the lottery is neutral), then the lottery with support on S is weakly preferred to the lottery with support on T if and only if
Now it is straightforward to define strategy-proofness. GivenK ⊆ K and N ⊆ N , the social choice function fK ,N : DN → 2K\{∅} is said to be manipu- and all permutations µ :
The last property to be introduced is strict monotonicity. It can be motivated by interpreting the set fK(DN ) of size bigger than one as a situation where a tie occurs among all alternatives belonging to fK(DN ). Then, the tie is broken in favor of a subset S of fK(DN ) whenever alternatives in S receive additional support by some individual everything else unchanged.
Definition 6
The social choice rule f : DN → 2K\ {∅} K ⊆K,N ⊆N is said to be strictly monotone if for all sets S ⊆K ⊆ K, S = ∅ andN ⊆ N, and all pairs of preference profiles DN , D N ∈ DN which are such that for some i,
In order to characterize Approval Voting by means of the described proper- and there is an i ∈N whose preference relation D i is such that either G(
It is easy to see that the family gK ,N K ⊆K,N ⊆N is strategy-proof on the cohesive dichotomous domain, because no individual has incentives either to vote for a bad alternative or not to vote for a good alternative. To show that the derived social welfare function does not satisfy IIA for someN ⊆ N suppose that K = {x, y, z} and N = {1, 2, 3}. Let the preference profiles is neutral by assumption and the empty set cannot be selected. This is a contradiction to f {x,y} (DN ) = {x}, and therefore, C = ∅.
Since f {x,y} (DN ) = {x} by assumption, consistency in individuals implies that
We prove in the next step that if j ∈ C, then f {x,y} D j , D C\{j} = {x}.
This is a contradiction, and therefore, we can conclude that f {x,y} D j , D C\{j} = {x}.
Let M ⊂ C be such that j ∈ M and 2 ≤ |M | < |C|. Suppose that for all
On the other hand, if yP i x, In the Appendix it is shown that Theorem 1 is tight. The result which is closest to Theorem 1 is due to Fishburn [8] who characterizes Approval Voting as the only anonymous family of social choice functions (he allows only the set of individuals to vary and considers the set of feasible alternatives to be fixed) that is strategy-proofness, neutral and consistent. 7 Using the current notation Fishburn's consistency property is defined as follows: LetD be the domain of 7 Actually Fishburn [8] uses the following extension to preferences on subsets of alternatives: The weak preference relation D i on 2 K \{∅} is as follows: (a) {x}˙ R i {x, y}˙ R i {y} if x ∈ G(Ri) and y ∈ B(Ri); (b) for all S, T ∈ 2 K \{∅},
. This preference extension is weaker than the cohesive preferences extension proposed in this paper, but its disadvantage is that it induces a non complete ordering on 2 K \{∅}. Consequently, one has to check for possible manipulations only for all comparable non-empty subsets of K. This result can be found in Moulin [13] as an exercise and can be interpreted as an extension of May's Theorem [11] Notice that 0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ n. Moreover, the preference profile D ∈ D N has the following three properties:
the preference profile D ∈ D N which is such that for all x ∈ K and i ∈ N ,
y ∈ K and f treats all alternatives with the same support similarly by Lemma 3. Next, verify the following three properties of the preference profile D ∈ D N : Given
Finally, we are going to establish that x ∈ f (D ) if and only if 
for all y ∈ K. Therefore, x ∈ G D q by construction of the preference profile
The examples in the Appendix show that Theorem 2 is tight. Theorem 2 is inspired by the following version of May's Theorem [11] : Suppose that K = 2.
The social choice function f : R N → {{x}, {x, y}, {y}} is anonymous, neutral, and strictly monotone if and only if f is the Majority Rule. Hence, Theorem 2 shows that May's Theorem can be extended to any number of alternatives if anonymity is replaced by the stronger property of strict symmetry. The last result of the paper states that under strict symmetry and neutrality, strict monotonicity can be replaced by the property of efficiency (there is no other non-empty subset of alternative such that some individual is better off and no individual is worse off according to her/his cohesive preferences). Step 1: In the beginning, define the set Step 1.1: Suppose that g(x) = 1. If x ∈ G(D 1 ) and x ∈ G(D 1 ), then there is an
for all y ∈ K and in particular for alternative x ∈ S 1 . Let 1 < i ≤ n be the smallest integer such that x ∈ G(D i ) and x ∈ G(D i ). Next, set the preference y ∈ K and in particular for alternative z ∈ S 1 . Let 1 < j ≤ n be the smallest integer such that z ∈ G(D 1.m j ) and z ∈ G(D j ). Next, set the preference profile
and N y (D 1 ) = N y (D) for all y ∈ K. Let 2 ≤ t < n − 1, and, given the integer t, define the preference
Suppose that for all 2 ≤ t ≤ t, f Dt = f Dt −1 and N y Dt = N y (Dt −1 ) for all y ∈ K. To finish the proof we have to show that f (D t+1 ) = f (D t ).
Step t+1: In the beginning, define the set S t+1 as
Notice that S t+1 consists of all alternatives which are ordered differently for individual t + 1 according to the preference
If s t+1 > 0, then, without loss of generality, we can order the alternatives in S t+1 according to the one-to-one
is the set obtained by applying the mapping g to all elements of S t+1 ). Now proceed to step t + 1.1 of the algorithm.
Step t+1.1: Suppose that g(x) = 1. If x ∈ G(D t t+1 ) and x ∈ G(D t+1 ), then there is an individual i > t + 1 such that x ∈ G(D i ) and x ∈ G(D t i ), because by the induction hypothesis N y (D t ) = N y (D ) for all y ∈ K (and in particular for alternative x ∈ S t+1 ) and
Notice that for all y ∈ K, N y (D t+1.1 ) = N y (D t ). On the other hand, if x ∈ G(D t+1 ) and x ∈ G(D t t+1 ), then there exists an individual j > t + 1 such that x ∈ G(D t j ) and x ∈ G(D j ), because by the induction hypothesis N y (D t ) = N y (D ) for all y ∈ K (and in particular for alternative x ∈ S t+1 ) and D t l = D l for all l ≤ t. Let t + 1 < j ≤ n be the smallest integer such that x ∈ G(D t j ) and x ∈ G(D j ). Next, set the preference profile Step 2.2 Finally, consider alternative x ∈ S 2 . Since x ∈ G D 2. 
Tightness of Theorem 1
We exhibit four social choice rules different from Approval Voting which violate one property each.
Strategy-Proofness:
Due to Vorsatz [16] the Borda Count is equivalent to Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain. Since all scoring rules are anonymous, neutral and strictly monotone, any scoring rule different from the Borda Count must be manipulable on the cohesive dichotomous domain according to Theorem 1.
A direct proof of this result can also be found in Vorsatz [16] .
Neutrality:
Let the family of social choice functions fK 
Strict Monotonicity:
Given DN ∈ DN , let C ⊆N be such that i ∈ C if and only if 0 < g(D i ) <k.
Define the family of social choice functions fK 
Tightness of Theorem 2 and 3
We exhibit three social choice functions which violate in each Theorem one property each. 
